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Abstract
In the processing and manufacturing industries, there has been a large push to produce higher
quality products and ensure maximum efficiency of processes, which requires approaches to effectively
detect and resolve disturbances to ensure optimal operations. While many types of disturbances can
be compensated by a control system, it cannot handle some large process disruptions. As such,
it is important to develop monitoring systems to effectively detect and identify those faults such
that they can be quickly resolved by operators. This article proposes a novel probabilistic fault
detection and identification method which adopts a newly developed deep learning approach using
Bayesian recurrent neural networks (BRNNs) with variational dropout. The BRNN model is general
and can model complex nonlinear dynamics. Moreover, compared to traditional statistic-based
data-driven fault detection and identification methods, the proposed BRNN-based method yields
uncertainty estimates which allow for simultaneous fault detection of chemical processes, direct
fault identification, and fault propagation analysis. The performance of the method is demonstrated
and contrasted to (dynamic) principal component analysis, which is widely applied in the industry,
in the benchmark Tennessee Eastman process (TEP) and a real chemical manufacturing dataset.
Keywords: fault detection, fault identification, recurrent neural networks, variational dropout,
Bayesian inference, Tennessee Eastman process.
1. Introduction
In industrial manufacturing processes, a fault is defined as any abnormal deviation from the
normal operating conditions (NOC). Faults are a concern because even small faults in a complex
industrial system can initiate a series of events that result in loss of efficiency and reliability. As a
result, there is a need for techniques to improve the process’s reliability and up-time. Effective fault
detection and identification (FDI) is important for monitoring components for making appropriate
maintenance decisions. First, fault detection determines whether a fault has occurred in the system
(also characterized as anomaly detection in other applications). Then fault identification determines
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which observation variables are most relevant to diagnosing the fault detected, thereby helping
operators to focus on specific subsystems. Systems that can accurately and promptly detect and
identify faults can more effectively inform operators and engineers and significantly reduce the effort
and time to recover the system.
A number of FDI methods have been proposed in the literature. Since analytical and knowledge-
based methods are impractical in most large-scale modern industrial processes, data-driven methods
have dominated the literature for the past decade and have been effective in practice, taking advan-
tage of increasing levels of instrumentation and widespread availability of sensor data (Qin, 2009;
Ge et al., 2013; Yin et al., 2014; Chiang et al., 2000a). The choice of model used to characterize the
NOC and deviations thereof is still a crucial aspect in these methods because the limitations of the
model lead to decreased detection rates or increased occurrence of fault alarms.
A number of data-driven methods including principal component analysis (PCA) (Jolliffe, 2011),
partial least squares (Kourti and MacGregor, 1996), Fisher discriminant analysis (Fisher, 1936;
Chiang et al., 2000a), and support vector machines (Chiang et al., 2004), have been applied for
fault detection and identification in industry with varying degrees of success. The most widely
used method is PCA which models the correlations between the process variables. PCA can detect
faults effectively when the sensor measurements are highly correlated, which is often the case. For
many processes, the temporal dynamics also need to be taken into consideration, especially when
fast sampling rates are used, because the dynamics provide additional information through which to
detect deviations from the NOC. To that end, DPCA has been proposed to handle serially correlated
multivariate observations (Ku et al., 1995). DPCA can be viewed as a multivariate autoregressive
model with exogenous inputs (ARX). PCA and DPCA are both limited by the linear model structure
and correlations in the process’ dynamics. Methods for extending PCA to nonlinearities such as
kernel PCA and neural network-based PCA (Lee et al., 2004; Hsieh, 2006) have been well studied
only for static systems. As such, the development of approaches that can effectively model nonlinear
system structure and dynamics has been an active research field.
Neural network (NN) based methods have also received significant attention because of their
capability and flexibility for modeling complex structure and temporal dynamics. NN models have
been used for fault detection in three general frameworks: (1) as a fault classification tool between
normal and known faulty conditions (Zarei et al., 2014; Chine et al., 2016; Ince et al., 2016; Jia
et al., 2016; Wu and Zhao, 2018; Hu and Jiang, 2019; Lee et al., 2017; Li et al., 2014; Zhang and
Zhao, 2017), (2) as a model of the input-output variable relationships during NOC (Malhotra et al.,
2015; Patan et al., 2008; Moustapha and Selmic, 2007; Talebi et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2017; Nie
et al., 2018), or (3) as a generalization of the basic fault detection methods such as NN-based PCA
(Kramer, 1992; Dong and McAvoy, 1996) using statistical indices to monitor the process. The
first two approaches are dominant for NN-based fault detection. The first approach can be highly
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effective due to the up-front knowledge of specific fault conditions to detect. It can also be set up
to classify each fault which directly enables fault diagnosis. On the other hand, training these NNs
requires substantial amounts of data under fault conditions but these data are usually quite limited
for chemical manufacturing processes compared to NOC data. Moreover, it is hard to assess the
performance of these methods for fault conditions other than for which the classifier is explicitly
trained for. In the second approach, NNs are used to model the process by capturing the nonlinear,
multivariate, and temporal dependencies from inputs to outputs. In this approach, the NN models
are typically trained on NOC data to predict the system outputs. This NN is then used for fault
detection during runtime by comparing the predictions of the NN with the actual system output
measurements, and a fault is detected if the difference is significantly large. This approach has the
advantage that the NNs are trained using only NOC data, which is usually abundant, and that
the NNs are not constrained by the type of fault because detection is marked from any significant
deviation from the NOC. On the other hand, the model must accurately characterize these complex
and potentially nonlinear structures between inputs and outputs in the process, or its fault detection
will perform poorly as a result. Moreover, only faults that break the input-output relationships are
considered, meaning that faults due to input disturbances will likely not be detected. In the third
approach, NNs are used to account for nonlinearities in the process but, like other PCA-based
methods, fail to appropriately model the process dynamics.
There are other challenges regarding both approaches, which have limited the application of NNs
in industrial process monitoring. First, fault identification has not yet been properly addressed. Once
a fault is detected, it is typically difficult to identify the input variables most relevant to the fault
from a complex NN model. Even if an NN is trained to directly classify the fault, the underlying
cause may still be unclear if there are multiple explanations for the observed fault type. Secondly,
standard NNs are deterministic models which lack an estimate of the uncertainty in the model
outputs. However, uncertainty and probabilistic estimates are important to assess the confidence
level associated with the decision of detecting a fault and for fault identification. Lastly, NNs are
prone to overfitting, meaning that they ‘memorize’ the particular characteristics of the training data
that are not relevant for new data. This overfitting must be addressed to ensure good generalization
to the full space of operating conditions of a complex industrial process.
For fault identification, contribution plots (Miller et al., 1998) are one of the most popular
techniques for providing information on the variables that are most strongly related to the faults. In
the context of PCA-based methods, contribution plots are obtained by quantifying the contribution
of each process variable to the individual scores of the PCA representation (Westerhuis et al., 2000).
Methods based on the contribution of each process variable in the residual space have also been
developed (Wise et al., 1989). However, the aforementioned limitations of PCA-based approaches
will also be reflected in the identification procedure and those methods require extra processing
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steps after fault detection. Moreover, those methods only provide the relative contribution value
of each variable which is not very useful. A more valuable and precise measure to aid operators in
diagnosis would be the probable severity of each affected variable. On the other hand, it has been
hard to extend contributions plots to NNs due to the complex and nonlinear relationships between
predictions and model inputs.
This article proposes a novel end-to-end FDI framework, which adopts a recently developed
Bayesian recurrent neural network (BRNN) architecture (Gal and Ghahramani, 2016b). The pro-
posed FDI framework is fundamentally different from the two types of frameworks that have been
previously used in the NN-based fault detection literature. The proposed framework uses BRNNs to
model the joint distribution and dynamics between all process variables. This framework provides
estimates of the prediction uncertainty, which capture both model uncertainty and the inherent noise
in the data. The BRNN is realized using the variational dropout approach proposed in (Gal and
Ghahramani, 2016a,b) due to its simplicity, regularization capability, strong generalization ability,
and scalability.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first time that Bayesian spatio-temporal models,
and BRNNs in particular, have been successfully applied to FDI in the chemical manufacturing
industry. The proposed approach tackles three key challenges typical of manufacturing systems:
(1) nonlinearity, (2) non-Gaussian distributed variables, and (3) high degree of spatio-temporal cor-
relations (i.e., temporal and sensor correlations). Furthermore, the probabilistic framework provided
by BRNNs enables more sensitive and robust FDI. Fault identification through the proposed BRNN-
based approach provides easily interpretable visualizations to the plant operators, for quick fault
type categorization, analysis of the possible fault propagation path, and root cause determination
using engineering judgment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief introduction to
RNNs and BRNNs, and describes the variational dropout approach used in this paper for inference
in BRNNs. Section 3 presents the proposed BRNN-based FDI methodology. In Section 4, the
effectiveness of the proposed approach is demonstrated and compared to (D)PCA-based methods in
the Tennessee Eastman process and a real chemical manufacturing process, followed by the conclusion
in Section 5.
2. Background
2.1. Recurrent Neural Networks
RNNs were developed in the 1980s (Rumelhart et al., 1986). Since then, RNNs have been shown
to achieve state-of-the-art performance on a wide range of sequential data modeling tasks, including
language modeling, speech recognition, image captioning, and music composition (Wu et al., 2016;
Jozefowicz et al., 2016; Merity et al., 2016). Generally speaking, an RNN comprises an input layer,
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Figure 1: A simple RNN structure with one recurrent layer and showing the unfolding in time of the sequence of its
forward computation. The RNN includes the input variable xt, state variable st and outputs yˆt. The state variable st
is calculated based on the previous state st−1 and the current input xt. The RNN output yˆt is then calculated based
on the current state. In this way, the input sequence xt is mapped to output sequence yˆt with each yˆt depending on
all previous inputs. The model parameters ω = {Ws,Us,Ws, bs, by} are shared at each time step.
one or more hidden recurrent layers, and an output layer. The input layer corresponds directly to the
input data, and hidden recurrent layers capture the state with the response of its nodes being added
to the inputs on the next time step. At each time t, denote the input to the network as xt ∈ Rmx ,
the state (i.e., output of the hidden layer) as st ∈ Rms , and the RNN output as yˆt ∈ Rmy . They
are represented as row vectors in the equations. Accordingly, the state and output layers have the
general form
st = fs(xt, st−1| θs)
yˆt = Wyst + by
(1)
where the subscript s = 1, . . . ,ms is the index over hidden layer nodes, θs and fs denote the
corresponding hidden layer parameter/weights and nonlinear operator for each node, and Wy ∈
Rmy×ms and by ∈ Rmy are the output layer parameters. The new state of the network depends on
its value at the previous time step, emblematic of recurrent architectures. This dependency, and
the unfolding through time, is depicted in Figure 1. A linear output layer is commonly used for
regression tasks.
In the simpler form of nodes, the state is computed as (Elman, 1990)
st = φ(Wsxt +Usst−1 + bs) (2)
where Ws ∈ Rms×mx , Us ∈ Rms×ms , and bs ∈ Rms are the hidden layer parameters (denoted θ
above), and φ is an element-wise activation function such as the logistic, hyperbolic tangent, or a
rectifier linear function.
As can be explicitly observed from the mathematical formulation in Equation 1, RNNs are essen-
tially state-space models capable of modeling nonlinear dependencies. RNNs can capture complex
nonlinear dynamics of a system in the state. Also, by appropriately training the parameters, RNNs
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can adapt to the right level of temporal depth. Thus, RNN models are considerably more powerful
for modeling complex industrial processes in comparison to traditional statistical methods.
It is worth noting that different RNN architectures have been proposed (Jordan, 1997), with the
formulation in Equation 1 corresponding to Elman’s architecture (Elman, 1990), which has been
widely used in the recent deep learning RNN implementations and applications.
In order to learn the parameters of the RNN, an optimization problem is defined with regard
to an appropriate loss function. For regression tasks, the loss function is typically chosen to be the
mean squared loss,
J(Θ) =
1
N
N∑
t=1
‖yt − yˆt‖22, (3)
or the cross-entropy loss for classification purposes,
J(Θ) = −
N∑
t=1
yt log yˆt (4)
where Θ denotes the collection of all RNN model parameters, and yt is the desired output at time
step t. In addition, L2 regularization terms are often added to help prevent overfitting, resulting in
the overall minimization objective
L(Θ) = J(Θ) + λ
(‖Ws‖2 + ‖Wy‖2 + ‖Us‖2) (5)
where λ is the regularization (aka weight decay) parameter.
Because the recurrence introduces dependencies between time steps, training RNNs involves
backpropagation through time (BPTT) to compute the gradient update of the model parameters
that minimizes the loss function (Werbos, 1974, 1990). BPTT corresponds to an unfolding of the
network over a number of time steps, as depicted in Figure 1. For BPTT, the difference between
network outputs and target values is first calculated and stored for each time step in a forward
pass, and then the weight gradient updates are calculated as the network is “rolled back”. However,
simple RNNs trained with BPTT can have difficulties learning long-range time dependencies due to
the vanishing gradient problem (Bengio et al., 1994). To alleviate the vanishing gradient problem,
recurrent node gating mechanisms have been recently developed. These gating mechanisms allow
information and the gradients to flow through the unrolled network with minimal attenuation if
determined to be necessary by BPTT. These gating mechanisms resulted in two popular variations
on RNN hidden units: LSTM units (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997) and GRUs (Cho et al.,
2014). RNNs with LSTM and GRU units have been reported to show salient performance (Graves
et al., 2013; Cakir et al., 2015).
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2.2. BRNNs
BRNNs combine statistical modeling of RNN parameters to obtain a probabilistic model of
input-output mapping. As such, instead of point estimates, BRNNs can effectively perform Bayesian
inference which provides probabilistic distributions over the outputs.
To realize that capability, BRNNs view the model parameters ω = {Ws,Wy,Us, bs, by} as
random variables from a prior distribution p(ω). Expressing the functional dependence in Equation 1
as st = f
ω
s (xt, st−1) and yˆt = f
ω
y (st), the likelihood of the output for each data point is
p(yt|ω,xt, st, τ) = N
(
yt|fωy
(
fωs (xt, st−1) , τ
−1ID
))
(6)
where τ is the precision parameter that reflects the intrinsic noise in the data, and the likelihood
function is assumed to have a normal distribution for simplicity. Note how the likelihood function
is evaluated with respect to forward passes through the NN.
Then, given a training dataset comprising X and Y , learning entails estimating the posterior
distribution p(ω|X,Y ) over the space of parameters. With the updated distribution, the distribution
of a predicted output y∗ can be obtained by integration
p(y∗|x∗,X,Y ) =
∫
p(y∗|x∗, ω)p(ω|X,Y )dω (7)
where the dependency on the precision parameter, state, and past inputs are not shown to simplify
the expression. For the prior distribution, standard zero-mean Gaussian priors over the weight
matrices p(W ) and p(U) are typically chosen, with point estimates for the bias vectors assumed for
simplicity. The uncertainty in the prediction will be directly reflected in the posterior distribution
p(y∗|x∗,X,Y ).
In complex models such as NNs, however, the exact inference of the posterior is not possible.
Moreover, traditional algorithms for approximating the Bayesian inference are generally not appli-
cable to train RNNs having a large number of parameters or complex architectures. To overcome
this limitation, several approximation inference methods have been proposed, including variational
dropout (Gal and Ghahramani, 2016b,a), Bayes by BackProp (Pawlowski et al., 2017; Fortunato
et al., 2017), multiplicative normalizing flows (Louizos and Welling, 2017), and probabilistic back-
propagation (Herna´ndez-Lobato and Adams, 2015). Among all those techniques, the variational
dropout technique proposed by Gal and Ghahramani (2016b) is adopted in this paper because of
its simplicity and generalization capability. In particular, variational dropout can be applied to any
RNN architecture without modification on the underlying NN structure, and only concurrent runs
of the trained model are needed for online application. Details of this algorithm are reviewed in the
next section.
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2.3. Variational Dropout as Bayesian Approximation
Gal and Ghahramani (2016a) showed how dropout could be used as a general variational ap-
proximation to the posterior of Bayesian neural networks (BNNs), which can be applied directly to
a variety of NN architectures. The main advantage of this ‘variational dropout’ approach is that
it does not require significant modifications to the model architecture and training method, unlike
other probabilistic approximation methods. Moreover, the uncertainty estimation incurs only the
computation cost due to multiple stochastic forward passes through the network to generate samples
of the posterior distribution.
Therefore, variational dropout is used here as a variational inference approach for BNNs. Varia-
tional inference is a technique used to approximate an intractable posterior distribution p(ω|X,Y )
with a simpler parameterized distribution q(ω). Then, the integration in Equation 7 can be ap-
proximated simply by MC integration using q(ω). Specifically, the approximation distribution is
factorized over the weight matrices in ω. For each row wk, variational dropout imposes a variation
distribution comprising a mixture of two Gaussian distributions with small variances,
q(wk) = pN(wk|0, σ2I) + (1− p)N(wk|mk, σ2I), (8)
where p is the predefined dropout probability, σ2 is a small precision parameter, and mk is a varia-
tional parameter. The learning problem is then casted into an optimization problem by minimizing
the KLD between q(ω) and p(ω|X,Y ). It can be shown that optimizing the loss function using
dropout is equivalent to minimizing KL(q(ω)‖p(ω|X,Y ))) (Gal and Ghahramani, 2016a), which
updates the variational parameter. Although variational inference is a biased approximation, it has
been shown to work well in practice.
Variational dropout requires caution when applied in the context of RNNs, however. Because
of the recurrence, na¨ıvely applying standard dropout (Srivastava et al., 2014) with different masks
at each time step of an RNN can lead to model instabilities and disrupt an RNN’s capability to
model a sequence (Pham et al., 2014; Pachitariu and Sahani, 2013). We use the approach in (Gal
and Ghahramani, 2016b) to resolve these issues. Under these circumstances, variational dropout has
been shown to also act as an effective regularization method for reducing overfitting by preventing
co-adaptions in RNNs (Gal and Ghahramani, 2016b).
The implementation of BRNNs with variational dropout is relatively straightforward. During
both training and testing, the variational approximation involves sampling the model distribution
with regard to the variational distribution over the weights, which is implemented by dropping out
(i.e., forcing to zero) randomly chosen inputs, outputs, and hidden states. This step results in
multiple random realizations of the RNN model, each obtained by implicitly removing a portion of
the inputs, outputs, or hidden states. However, as detailed in (Gal and Ghahramani, 2016b), it is
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Figure 2: Illustration of the variational dropout technique (right) compared to standard dropout technique (left) for a
simple RNN. Each graph shows units unfolded over time, with the lower level for inputs, middle level for state units,
and upper level for output units. Vertical arrows represent the connections from inputs to outputs while horizontal
arrows represent recurrent connections. The arrows with dashed grey lines represent the standard connection without
dropout. Colored lines represent dropout connections with different colors for different dropout masks. (Left) In
the standard dropout technique, no dropout is applied for the recurrent layers, while other connections have different
dropout masks at different time steps. (Right) For the variational dropout approach proposed in (Gal and Ghahramani,
2016b), dropout is applied to both input, recurrent, and output layers with the same dropout mask at different time
steps. Variational dropout is applied during both training and testing.
crucial for RNNs that the dropout mask used for each model realization be kept fixed between time
steps. In other words, the dropout mask of which elements are zeroed out is sampled and frozen
for each time sequence sample. This sampling characteristic is contrasted to standard dropout in
Figure 2.
Variational dropout applied during testing can be viewed as an approximation to MC samples
from the posterior predictive distribution, p (ω|X,Y ). Given a new observation x∗, by forward
passing it N times, N samples {yˆ∗(i)}i=1,...,N are collected of the approximate predictive posterior.
The corresponding empirical estimators for the posterior predictive mean, standard deviation, and
covariance are
E(yˆ∗) ≈ 1
N
N∑
i=1
yˆ∗(i) (9)
std(yˆ∗) ≈
√√√√τ−1 + 1
N
N∑
i=1
(yˆ∗(i))2 − E(yˆ∗)2 (10)
cov(yˆ∗) ≈ τ−1ID + 1
N
N∑
i=1
yˆ∗(i)>yˆ∗(i)− E(yˆ∗)>E(yˆ∗) (11)
where τ can be estimated as τ = pl
2
2Nλ given a predefined regularization/weight-decay parameter λ,
and prior length scale l (Gal and Ghahramani, 2016a). Higher order statistics can also be estimated
using the samples by moment-matching.
Since the forward passes involve simply a number of independent and fixed realizations of the
RNN model distribution, they can be done concurrently, thus making variational dropout a good
9
Figure 3: General procedure for process monitoring system development (left) versus procedure for developing BRNN-
based FDI system (right). The general framework to establish a monitoring system begins with a model to characterize
NOC behavior, such as using the BRNN model to learn the NOC pattern from the training data. Then, the method to
measure the deviation of a particular observation to the NOC region is chosen. In our case, the process observations
are compared to the BRNN posterior predictive distributions. Finally, the decision will involve determining whether
the acquired observation is from the NOC or not (i.e., compare deviations of observations for fault detection and
assess which variables significantly deviate from the NOC for identification).
candidate for online monitoring. In the next section, the proposed novel FDI scheme is explained
in detail. While this methodology is described here in the context of chemical process monitoring,
it can be observed that it could be readily extended to other manufacturing industries.
3. Methodology for FDI
The design of a FDI system generally begins with the development of a model to characterize
the normal operating characteristics of a process. Historical data collected during the NOC are used
to build the model, which means this learning problem is unsupervised. Then, an approach must be
established to characterize the magnitude of the deviation from the NOC based on the developed
model and to determine when deviations are considered to be outside of the NOC. For example,
the T 2 and Q statistics are commonly used to measure the distance of the observation to the NOC
region in PCA-based models and thresholds thereon (Chiang et al., 2000a). Finally, given a new
observation x∗, these measures are calculated to determine whether x∗ deviates substantially from
the NOC (fault detection) and, if that is the case, which variables are significantly affected (fault
identification), thereby assisting in locating and troubleshooting the fault.
Specifically, this paper proposes using a BRNN with variational dropout to build the probabilistic
model, denoted as fω(·), and characterize the NOC and its intrinsic variability. As discussed earlier,
BRNNs are capable of extracting the nonlinear spatial and temporal signatures in the data that
are critical for characterizing complex chemical processes. Moreover, BRNNs provide probabilistic
estimates of the likelihood of the observations with regard to its inferred posterior distribution
of the variable values. These likelihood estimates lend themselves to be used to assess the current
deviation level from the NOC region. Accordingly, observations are detected as faults whenever their
10
Figure 4: Depiction of BRNN model using variational dropout (left) for FDI. The BRNN model uses the current
observation and state to predict the next system observation. The BRNN model is unrolled in two dimensions (right):
the time of the computation involved in its forward computation and the stochastic repetition by variational dropout.
At each time step, stochastic variational dropout is applied N times and the corresponding MC prediction samples
{xˆt(i)}i=1,...,N are used to approximate the posterior predictive distribution for that time step. For the next time
step, the same procedure is repeated and MC samples {xˆt+1(i)}i=1,...,N are collected and used to approximate the
distribution.
deviation is above a threshold, determined such that the number of false alarms under the NOC
does not exceed a predefined level. Fault identification then involves determining which process
attributes are deviating significantly. This general framework for BRNN-based FDI is summarized
in Figure 3 and described in detail in the next sections.
3.1. Fault Detection
The first step toward fault detection is to learn a model to characterizing the NOC. This step
involves training a BRNN with variational dropout to model the dynamics in time, correlations
between sensors, and the prediction uncertainty resulting from model mismatch and inherent system
variability/noise.
The BRNN model is trained directly on historical NOC data. Specifically, this step involves
setting a training problem wherein the BRNN model uses the past context (as captured by its state)
and current observation to predict the next observation, as depicted in Figure 4. During training,
BPTT is applied to batches of time subsequences with one variational dropout mask sampled per
sequence, as explained in Section 2.3.
After training, the model output xˆt+1 from the BRNN is sampled from the posterior predictive
distribution for next observation xt+1 via variational dropout model realizations. That is, at each
time step t, the stochastic forward pass is repeated N times, each with a different dropout mask,
and the predictive distribution of the output for t + 1 is approximated based on the MC samples
of the BRNN model, {xˆt+1(i)}i=1,...,N . Then, when the true observation xt+1 is available, it is
compared to the predictive distribution and deemed as abnormal if it significantly deviates from the
predictive distribution. Finally, the true observation is fed into the BRNN model and the procedure
is repeated for the next time step.
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Notice that the predictive distribution is evolving, which provides an adaptive decision boundary
for the next measurement. This adaptive decision boundary is calculated based on all the useful
past system information, which takes into consideration both the spatial and temporal correlations
in the data. Further combined with the potential ability to model nonlinear correlations, this
property increases both the detection sensitivity and robustness because of the increasing accuracy
in modeling NOC pattern.
Depending on the complexity of the system and observed properties of the predictive distribution
from the BRNN model, below is a description of two methodologies to quantify the deviation mag-
nitude of each observation to its corresponding predictive distribution. The first method is faster
and simpler to implement, but is limited to Gaussian predictive posterior distributions. The second
method approximates the posterior distribution non-parametrically and is much more flexible, but
requires tuning an additional density estimation parameter.
3.1.1. Method 1: Squared Mahalanobis distance for Gaussian predictive distributions
If the predictive distribution is Gaussian, or well approximated as such, the squared Mahalanobis
distance can be used to characterize the magnitude of the deviation. First, the MC samples at time
t of the predictive distribution, {xˆt(i)}i=1,...,N , are used to approximate the sample mean µt and
covariance St:
µt ≈ 1
N
N∑
i=1
xˆt(i) (12)
St ≈ τ−1ID + 1
N
N∑
i=1
xˆt(i)
>
xˆt(i)− µ>t µt. (13)
Then, when the true observation xt is available, the squared Mahalanobis distance is calculated as
M2 = (xt − µt)>S−1t (xt − µt). (14)
A larger value of M2 indicates that the observation xt is far away from the predicted mean
and there is a higher likelihood that it corresponds to a fault. The detection threshold M2th is
determined with regard to a chosen maximum FAR α on a validation dataset. That is, the threshold
is the 100(1 − α)th percentile of the M2 statistic in the MC samples of the validation dataset.
Therefore, any data point with M2 exceeding the threshold (M2 > M2th) should be detected as a
fault.
3.1.2. Method 2: Local density ratio (LDR) for non-Gaussian predictive distributions
If the predictive distribution is not well characterized by a Gaussian distribution (e.g., is multi-
modal), then non-parametric methods are necessary to quantify the abnormality of each observation.
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For those cases, a LDR method is proposed, which is closely related to the so-called local outlier
factor (Breunig et al., 2000). The LDR statistic quantifies the abnormality of each new observation
with respect to its predictive distribution using an estimate of the density around the observation
based on its kNN.
The kNN local density estimate fˆ (x) can be calculated as (Duda et al., 2001)
fˆ(x) =
k∑
p∈Nk(x) d(p,x)
(15)
where Nk(x) denotes the set of kNN of x in {xˆt(i)}i=1,...,N and d(p,x) is the Euclidean distance
between x and a point p ∈ Nk(x). Intuitively, the points close to its kNN will have high local density
values, whereas points in more sparsely sampled or spread out areas will have low density.
Then, the LDR for an observation xt is defined as
LDR(xt) =
1
k
∑
p∈Nk(xt) fˆ(p)
fˆ(xt)
(16)
which is the ratio of the averaged local density of the kNN of xt in {xˆt(i)}i=1,...,N to the local
density of xt. A larger value of the LDR(xt) means that the observed point is far away from the
samples of the prediction posterior and thus indicates higher likelihood that the observation xt is
abnormal.
The number of kNN specifies the smallest number of data points in a cluster that will be con-
sidered as abnormal and is crucial for the algorithm to perform properly. In general, this number
defines a tradeoff, because a small value of k will result in large fluctuations, whereas a very large
value of k will reduce the detection sensitivity. As recommended in (Breunig et al., 2000), a mini-
mum and maximum k can be chosen and, for each observation, the final value can be set equal to
the maximum of LDR over k. The detection threshold LDRth is obtained similarly to M
2
th.
3.2. Fault Identification
Once a fault is detected, the next goal is to identify the main variables associated with the fault.
Without using labeled fault examples, this step involves determining the observation variables with
the abnormal deviations, which are most relevant to locate and troubleshoot the fault.
BRNN fault identification is obtained by applying the fault detection approach but independently
for each variable. To determine which variables deviate abnormally, each observation variable is
compared to its corresponding predicted marginal posterior distribution estimated from the BRNN
samples. More specifically, the observation xjt , corresponding to the j
th system variable at time t, is
compared to the predictive posterior distribution characterized by the samples {xˆjt (i)}i=1,...,N . This
variable-wise comparison allows the identification of variables with values in low probability areas
and thus more likely to be relevant for diagnosing the fault.
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The marginal posterior distributions used for identification still take into consideration the spatial
and temporal correlations in past data observations. Hence, the marginal distribution for each
variable also evolves with dynamics that depend on other variables and past observations. This
analysis sacrifices some information with regard to the complete joint distribution, as considered
during fault detection, but is necessary to obtain variable specificity.
As with fault detection, two methodologies to quantify the fault identification deviation are
described here, depending on the properties or assumptions placed on the predictive distribution.
The same considerations apply to these methodologies.
3.2.1. Method 1: Standard deviation for Gaussian predictive distributions
Assuming that the predictive distribution can be approximated by a Gaussian distribution, the
number of standard deviations of each variable to its predictive mean can be used to measure the
deviation. Using the same MC samples of the posterior predictive distribution generated for fault
detection at time t,
{
xˆt(i) = {xˆlt(i)}l=1,...,mx
}
i=1,...,N
, the mean µlt and standard deviation σ
l
t of
each variable xˆlt can be estimated by
µlt ≈
1
N
N∑
i=1
xˆlt(i) (17)
σlt ≈
√√√√τ−1 + 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
xˆlt(i)
)2 − (µlt)2 (18)
The deviation for each variable Dl, l ∈ {1, . . . ,mx}, is then calculated from
Dl =
xlt − µlt
σlt
(19)
The Dl can be either negative or positive, unlike M2 which can only be positive. Under a Gaussian
approximation, variables are identified as significantly affected by the disturbance based only on
whether Dl has a large magnitude (i.e., absolute value). Still, the sign of the deviation (positive or
negative) can be helpful to operators because the sign explicitly indicates whether the variable is
significantly higher or lower than expected. For a predefined significance level, the NOC validation
dataset can be used to determine thresholds {Dlth}i=1,...,N such that variables with (Dl > Dlth) are
explicitly highlighted as abnormal.
3.2.2. Method 2: LDR for non-Gaussian predictive distributions
For more general distributions, and similarly to the fault detection procedure, the LDR can be
used element-wise for fault identification by considering each variable separately in the calculation
of the LDR. Given the true measurement xt =
{
xlt
}
l=1,...,mx
and MC samples from predictive
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distribution
{
{xˆlt(i)}l=1,...,mx
}
i=1,...,N
, the LDR for variable l can be calculated by
fˆ(xlt) =
k∑
pl∈Nk(xlt) d(p
l, xlt)
(20)
LDRl(xlt) =
1
k
∑
pl∈Nk(xlt) fˆ(p
l)
fˆ(xlt)
(21)
where pl is one of the kNN of xlt and d(p
l, xlt) is the Euclidean distance between the p
l and xlt
sample. The same rule for selecting the number of nearest neighbors k discussed with regard to
fault detection can be used here.
The variables associated with a large value of LDRl can be explicitly selected as significantly
affected by the fault. This is done similarly as for fault detection using the NOC validation dataset
to determine a threshold LDRlth above which variables are considered abnormal. Alternatively, the
variables can simply be sorted from the largest to the smallest such to emphasize the system variables
that deviate the most.
3.2.3. Fault identification plots
The fault identification statistics of each variable can be visualized by plotting their values over
time. The resulting plots are visually similar to contribution plots (Miller et al., 1998; Zhu and
Braatz, 2014). Their interpretation and analysis, however, are fundamentally different and are
referred to here as identification plots. The main distinction is that the statistics in identification
plots are specific to the current status of each variable and its dynamics, rather than as a relative
component of a global statistic. These plots provide greater specificity in the analysis and allows
the interpretation of the status of each variable directly.
3.3. FDI Scheme
For completeness, the overall methodology is summarized in Figure 5. Although the figure
explicitly shows the two methods for detecting and identifying faults, this decision of which method
to use is actually done at the design stage rather than during operations. In either case, the BRNN
model with variational dropout is crucial to the methodology by providing samples that characterize
the uncertainty and directly enable both FDI. The M2 or LDR statistics are used to detect the fault
in the system, while the Dl or LDRl statistics are used to identify the impacted variables useful
for locating the fault and possible root cause analysis. Minimal computation is needed for fault
identification, having to calculate only some additional statistics on the same samples.
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Figure 5: Flowchart of the BRNN-based FDI methodology. The offline training stage (left) and the online monitoring
stage (right) are shown in the figure. The procedure starts with offline training, and then the offline-trained model is
used during online monitoring. The choice of statistics for detection and identification is made at design time.
4. Case Studies
In this section, the effectiveness of the proposed BRNN-based FDI method is demonstrated in
two case studies: the benchmark Tennessee Eastman process synthetic dataset and a real dataset
from a chemical plant.
For comparison, results are also shown for PCA (Jackson and Mudholkar, 1979; Kourti and
MacGregor, 1996) and DPCA (Ku et al., 1995) FDI methods. For each method, both models with
and without dimension reduction are considered, and identified by prefix ‘r-’ or ‘f-’, respectively. For
the models with reduced dimension, parallel analysis (Downs and Vogel, 1993) is used to determine
the number of PCs a to retain in the model. These (D)PCA-based methods are commonly accepted
benchmark methods for algorithm comparison in the FDI community (Chiang et al., 2000a; Yin et al.,
2014; De Ketelaere et al., 2015; Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003). DPCA in particular provides an
interesting contrast to the proposed BRNN method because DPCA also models both spatial and
temporal correlations, albeit in a limited form. As mentioned in the introduction, DPCA is limited
to linear dynamics and correlations and scale poorly with increased temporal memory depth. The
proposed BRNN method does not have these limitations.
In both case studies, the BRNN model constructions were implemented in TensorFlow (Abadi
et al., 2015), and a number of BRNN model configurations and hyperparameters were tested.
The choices included different recurrent node types (regular RNN, GRU, and LSTM cells), acti-
vation functions (i.e., linear, sigmoid, hyperbolic tangent, and rectifier linear), number of recurrent
nodes/states ms, number of recurrent layers, regularization hyperparameter values λ, dropout prob-
abilities pd, and RNN training parameters (e.g., learning rate). BRNN models were trained for each
variation of these configurations and hyperparameters. The final model configuration and hyper-
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Figure 6: A process flowsheet for the TEP with the second control structure in (Downs and Vogel, 1993).
parameters were selected as the ones that gave the maximum likelihood on the validation dataset.
Only the results for the final BRNN model are shown in the next sections.
4.1. Tennessee Eastman Process
The Tennessee Eastman process (TEP) is a well-known benchmark by the Eastman Chemical
Company for process monitoring and control studies. It is based on a realistic industrial process
with properly modified components, kinetics, and operating conditions (Downs and Vogel, 1993). In
this study, the second plant-wide control strategy was utilized, with the process flowsheet as shown
in Figure 6. The process contains eight components (A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H) and five major
units (a reactor, condenser, compressor, separator and stripper).
In this case study, mx = 52 variables are used to construct the monitoring system, of which 41
are sensor measurements (XMEAS(1)–XMEAS (41)) and 11 are manipulated variables (XMV(1)–
XMV(11)). During the NOC, the system is operating under one production mode and the sampling
period is set to 3 min. The training data contains 480 samples and the validation data contains 960
samples. The TEP simulation contains 21 preprogrammed faults with different disturbance types
and locations. Once a fault is introduced in the system, the system will either behave normally
if the control system is effective in controlling the disturbance, or it will evolve outside the NOC
region. For each set of data with a fault condition, the simulator first runs for 160 time points in
the normal state, and then the corresponding fault disturbance is introduced with the simulator
continuing to run for another 800 samples. The dataset used in this case study can be downloaded
from the website of Prof. Richard Braatz (Chiang et al., 2000b). For further details about the TEP
dataset, the reader is referred to Downs and Vogel (1993) or Chiang et al. (2000a).
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Although a number of BRNN model architecture variations were tried as previously mentioned,
the final BRNN model used in this case study contains one recurrent layer with regular RNN cell
and linear activation function. A linear dense layer is used for the output layer, as is commonly
done for regression tasks. This structure means that, in this case, the BRNN model implements a
probabilistic linear state-space model. Although this architecture is simpler, it is also easier to train
and achieved better performance than more complex structures and neuron types. The results are
likely due to the fact that the inherent correlations and dynamics in the NOC data of TEP are well
modeled as linear (Sun, 2020). The final model has ms = 80 hidden nodes in the recurrent layer,
and is trained with regularization parameter λ = 10−4 and dropout rate pd = 0.1. Given the linear
structure of the model and by the central limit theorem, the predictive distribution by the final
BRNN model is well approximated by the Gaussian distribution in this case. Thus, the M2 and Dl
statistics are used for FDI. In any event, the results are quite similar for a number of configurations
of the hyperparameters within a reasonable tuning range.
For the reduced dimensionality (D)PCA models used in the comparison, the number of PCs
determined by parallel analysis is a = 12 for r-PCA and a = 25 for r-DPCA (with lag = 1). The
fault detection procedure for r-PCA and r-DPCA use both the T 2 and Q statistics, whereas f-PCA
and f-DPCA use only the T 2 statistic for fault detection, which plays the same role as the M2
statistic. Contribution plots are used for (D)PCA-based fault identification. For implementation
details on the (D)PCA methods, the reader is referred to (Russell et al., 2000), (Zhu and Braatz,
2014), or (Chiang et al., 2000a).
The false alarm rate (FAR) and fault detection rate (FDR) are used to evaluate the fault detection
performance of different algorithms:
FAR =
# of samples with alarm during NOC
total # of samples during NOC
(22)
FDR =
# of samples with alarm after the fault is introduced in the system
total # of samples after the fault is introduced in the system
(23)
In words, the FAR corresponds to the frequency of spurious detection of faults under NOC, and
FDR is the sample frequency of a fault being detected when a fault situation is present.
The dataset contains three types of faults: controllable faults, back-to-control faults, and uncon-
trollable faults. Controllable faults are disturbances that can be well compensated by the control
system, and therefore the disturbance does not significantly affect the process state. In these situa-
tions, since the operator is not required to intervene, the FDR should ideally be as low as the FAR
to avoid distracting the operators. Back-to-control faults are disturbances that are large enough to
cause the system to initially deviate from the NOC, but for which the control system is able to com-
pensate at least some aspects of the disturbance after some time. The process measurements return
to the normal region after some time, but certain manipulated or input variables remain outside
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the normal regime. These represent sub-optimal or off-spec conditions that ought to be handled by
an operator and to be detected accordingly. Moreover, the FDI result should accurately reflect the
system state, such that its evolution back to control is apparent. Finally, uncontrollable faults are
faults that cannot be handled adequately by the control system and require operator intervention.
For both back-to-control and uncontrollable faults, the fault detection algorithm should ideally yield
high FDR to notify the operator that the system has been disturbed outside the original NOC. It is
worth noting that this “classification” is based on prior knowledge of the faults and used here only
to facilitate the interpretation of the results; it was not used anywhere in the model training.
For fault identification, the proposed BRNN-based identification plots are compared with the
(D)PCA-based contribution plots, which are shown for a representative fault of each of the afore-
mentioned types. Note that, ideally, fault identification should accurately pinpoint the variables
that are affected by the fault to provide the operators with specific information for them to analyze
the situation and quickly diagnose the underlying root cause. Accordingly, it should be verified
that no variable should be identified as abnormal for controllable faults. For back-to-control faults,
the abnormal variables should first be identified, and only the corresponding tuned manipulated
variables should remain identified once the system is back to control. For uncontrollable faults, the
identification procedure should correctly locate the abnormal variables as soon as they are outside
the NOC regime.
4.1.1. Training and validation results on the NOC data
The training and validation results are first shown to demonstrate how the posterior predictions
of the BRNN model characterize the NOC. The training results of the total 52 variables with centered
and normalized values are shown in Figure 7. The dark blue lines are the real data and the light
blue lines are the posterior prediction samples by the BRNN model with N = 400 model samples by
variational dropout. The results do not differ significantly for N > 100. When the real measurements
are within the predictive distribution (in dark and light blue in the figures, respectively), the system
is considered normal. This condition can be observed in Figure 7, which indicates that the trained
BRNN model accurately captures the NOC pattern.
Then, to validate the model, the trained BRNN model is applied to a separate NOC validation
dataset. These results are shown in Figure 8. As observed in the training results, the real validation
measurements lie within the predictive distribution. This result indicates that the model generalizes
well, meaning that it is able to capture the normal pattern without overfitting to the training data,
which is crucial to avoiding high FARs.
4.1.2. Fault detection results
The fault detection results for the 21 predefined faults are shown in Table 1. The results are
grouped according to one of the above-mentioned three types of faults. For all algorithms, the FDRs
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Figure 7: BRNN model outputs for TEP NOC training data. The plot shows all 52 variables in TEP. The dark
blue lines are the TEP measurements and the light blue lines correspond to the BRNN model predictive distribution
outputs for the NOC data. For measurements under the NOC, the dark blue lines should lie within the predictive
distribution.
are estimated with regard to the threshold estimated for a FAR of 5%, and validated on NOC data
as shown on the first row of the table.
As shown in Table 1, the proposed BRNN-based method yields close to 5% FDR on controllable
faults, which is almost as low as the pre-determined FAR level. On the other hand, (D)PCA-based
methods are overly sensitive in these cases, especially the models without model reduction, f-PCA
and f-DPCA. These results show that (D)PCA-based methods cannot accurately differentiate the
controllable faults from the other cases, because they do not appropriately characterize the dynamics
of NOC, such as to determine if the situation is ultimately controllable. As previously explained,
controllable faults should not trigger an alert because they are handled directly by the control
system. The ability of the fault detection approach to differentiate between these situations is of
crucial practical importance because alerts due to these situations will often be perceived as false
alarms and can erode an operator’s confidence in the method and the significance of its alerts. The
BRNN method is observed to be more robust to controllable fault than the (D)PCA methods.
For both back-to-control and uncontrollable faults, the BRNN method reliably detected faults
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Figure 8: BRNN model outputs for TEP NOC validation data.
with high FDRs. Full PCA and DPCA models with the squared Mahalanobis distance were also
able to detect the back-to-control and uncontrollable faults with high FDR. However, the (D)PCA
models were overly sensitive for general fault detection purposes because they overreacted to con-
trollable faults. Compared to the BRNN method, (D)PCA models emphasized higher sensitivity to
disturbances at the expense of an increased likelihood of unwarranted alerts. The reduced dimen-
sionality (D)PCA models (i.e., r-PCA and r-DPCA), with the number of PCs determined by parallel
analysis, responded more reasonably to controllable faults but also yield much worse performance
compared to the BRNN method. In fact, they fail to reliably detect several back-to-control and
uncontrollable faults (Faults 5, 16, and 19, for example).
It is insightful to consider how the temporal dynamics interact with the detection approach to
lead to the measured FDR results. If a disturbance is such that the measurements oscillate around
the NOC region, there will be moments in time that are momentarily indistinguishable from those in
the NOC region. Since the BRNN is trained such that its state characterizes the NOC distribution
in state space, it is understandable that some of these time points may not be detected as faulty.
This observation explains the slightly lower FDR of the BRNN method for those cases. Unlike the
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Table 1: TEP fault detection percentage results. The FAR is shown for the NOC (in the first row), and the FDR is
given for the 21 fault conditions.
Type Fault ID BRNN
r-PCA
(a = 12)
f-PCA
(a = 52)
r-DPCA
(a = 25)
f-DPCA
(a = 104)
NOC – 4.75 5.00 4.88 5.00 5.00
controllable
faults
IDV(3) 5.00 7.00 19.75 6.12 22.25
IDV(9) 5.00 7.88 15.25 8.87 21.37
IDV(15) 7.12 10.62 26.87 11.13 36.63
back to control
faults
IDV(4) 100.00 98.88 100.00 100.00 100.00
IDV(5) 100.00 32.62 100.00 34.50 100.00
IDV(7) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
uncontrollable
faults
IDV(1) 99.75 99.75 100.00 99.75 99.25
IDV(2) 99.00 98.75 99.12 98.62 99.12
IDV(6) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
IDV(8) 98.12 98.00 98.25 97.75 98.38
IDV(10) 87.38 54.13 93.50 55.75 94.63
IDV(11) 74.75 74.25 87.25 80.75 92.75
IDV(12) 99.75 99.00 100.00 99.25 100.00
IDV(13) 95.75 95.50 95.75 95.50 96.25
IDV(14) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
IDV(16) 90.38 46.50 95.50 48.50 97.00
IDV(17) 96.13 93.13 97.75 94.78 98.12
IDV(18) 90.63 90.38 91.50 90.50 92.87
IDV(19) 88.25 25.12 96.00 34.00 99.50
IDV(20) 78.63 58.25 92.13 61.75 92.37
IDV(21) 48.00 48.50 61.62 47.88 59.38
BRNN, the (D)PCA methods do not model internal system dynamics under the NOC. Hence, since
the internal dynamics are not considered when explaining the observed data, these models do not
have this detection ambiguity. This lack of ambiguity is achieved at the expense of the inability by
(D)PCA to assess whether a fault is controllable. In summary, the fault detection results indicate
the BRNN has high detection accuracy and is able to more robustly detect faults when operator
intervention is truly necessary.
Specific FDI results are presented and discussed in detail below. Faults 1, 3, and 5 are presented
because they are representative of each type. There was no significant differences between fault
within the same type. The use of the BRNN contribution plot results for fault propagation analysis
and one example is given for Fault 6.
4.1.3. Controllable fault: Fault 3
Fault 3 is considered first as a demonstrative controllable fault. For Fault 3, the D feed tempera-
ture in Stream 2 has a step change at the 160th time point. Since this change in feed temperature is
handled immediately and directly by the control system, the process is not driven outside its normal
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Figure 9: BRNN model outputs for TEP Fault 3.
operating state. In this case, a data-driven fault detection algorithm should not trigger the alarm
(beyond the chosen FAR).
The prediction results by the BRNN model are shown in Figure 9. Similarly to the NOC case, the
dark blue lines (i.e., real measurements) are within the distribution high-likelihood area characterized
by the light blue lines, which indicates that the system is operating under the NOC.
Fault identification results by the BRNN and (D)PCA methods are shown in Figures 10 and 11,
respectively. The color indicates the deviation from the NOC over time for each of the 52 variables.
The Dl statistic (c.f. Equation 19) is used in the BRNN identification plot. As shown in Figure 10,
the BRNN model identifies that no variable has its normal operating dynamics significantly affected
by Fault 3, as is expected. In contrast, the contribution plots in Figure 11bd, by the full PCA
and DPCA models, incorrectly identify several variables as being affected by the disturbance even
before the introduction of the disturbance (at the 160th sample). This further demonstrates the
oversensitiveness of those models. The r-PCA and r-DPCA models have identification results that
are similar to those of the BRNN model and are somewhat robust to controllable faults, but at the
expense of robustness in fault detection.
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Figure 10: Fault identification plot of the BRNN-Dl statistic for Fault 3. The
{
Dl
}
l=1,...,52
values for the 960
timesteps are color coded in the identification plot. Variables with dark blues have high values of Dl, meaning that
the variable has positively deviated from the NOC region. Conversely, variables with dark red have low values of Dl
and have negatively deviated from the NOC region. A light color means the variable is not significantly affected by
the disturbance. As expected, no variable significantly deviates from the NOC.
Figure 11: Contribution plots for Fault 3 from (a) r-PCA, (b) f-PCA, (c) r-DPCA, and (d) f-DPCA. The plot shows
the contribution factor and with the darkness of the blue color indicating the amount of deviation of the variable from
the NOC region.
24
In summary, for controllable faults, BRNN-based FDI is robust and successfully characterizes
those disturbances as corresponding to NOC. r-PCA and r-DPCA methods gave similar fault iden-
tification results but have lower detection rates (c.f. Table 1). The f-PCA and f-DPCA models were
clearly oversensitive, have high FARs, and incorrectly characterized the controllable faults in the
contribution plots.
4.1.4. Back-to-control fault: Fault 5
Fault 5 is a representative example of a back-to-control fault. This fault involves a step change in
condenser cooling water inlet temperature. This step change requires a step change in the condenser
cooling water flow rate XMV(11) by the control system. While the fault is ultimately controllable,
the fault causes the system at first to operate off-spec, or at least sub-optimally. In this particular,
immediately after the fault occurs, the system oscillates with about 32 variables exhibiting this
similar transient oscillation behavior. The process returns to control after about 10 hours, at which
point the sensor measurements XMEAS(1)–XMEAS(41) are back to their pre-disturbance set-points,
and only the manipulated variable XMV(11) remains outside the NOC regime, tuned so as to
compensate the step change in condenser cooling water inlet temperature.
The BRNN results for all of the variables are shown in Figure 12. As expected, when the
fault is introduced, several measurements in dark blue lines deviate from the posterior predictive
distribution under the NOC shown in light blue. After about 200 data points the system returns
to control, verified by the fact that all the system measurements (XMEAS(1)–XMEAS(41)) are
back within the predictive NOC region while only the manipulated variable XMV(11) maintains a
systematic deviation off-the-center of the BRNN model prediction distribution. These results show
that the BRNN model is able to correctly identify the NOC pattern and how the deviation from the
predictive distribution accurately locates the faulty variable under disturbance. The BRNN model
is also able to better assess the state of the system, distinguishing the back to control faults from
the uncontrollable faults by showing the transient deviation of the process variables and their return
to the NOC region.
The fault identification plot by BRNN is shown in Figure 13. This example showcases the typical
pattern of back to control faults, with several measurements outside the predictive region after the
fault is introduced and only the manipulated variables deviating once the system is back to steady
state. In this case, about 32 variables are affected once the disturbance is introduced to the system,
and the color switches between blue and red, indicating the system is oscillating. The plot also
clearly shows how, after the 360th time point, all system variables except XMV(11) are undoubtedly
back to normal. XMV(11) remains consistently above the predictive mean after the fault as that
is forced by the controller to compensate for the fault. However, the magnitude of the deviation of
XMV(11) is relatively small, indicating that the disturbance is no longer critical.
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Figure 12: BRNN model outputs for TEP Fault 5.
Figure 13: Fault identification plot by BRNN-Dl for Fault 5. The switch between dark blue and red colors shows
that the system is undergoing large fluctuation.
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Figure 14: Contribution plots for Fault 5 from (a) r-PCA, (b) f-PCA, (c) r-DPCA, and (d) f-DPCA.
The BRNN identification plot also contains crucial information for locating the likely root cause
of the fault. The plot clearly shows that XMEAS(22) is the first variable positively deviated from
the predictive distribution, which indicates the higher than normal separator cooling water outlet
temperature. Combined with the fact that the condenser cooling water flow rate is increased to
compensate for the disturbance to the system, one would reason that the root cause is the increase in
the condenser cooling water temperature. After the condenser cooling water temperature increases,
the outlet stream from the condenser to the separator also increases the temperature, resulting in
an increase in the temperature in the separator, which finally results in the increase in separator
cooling water outlet temperature.
For comparison purposes, the contribution plots by PCA and DPCA methods are shown in Figure
14. The r-PCA and r-DPCA model results in Figures 14ac fail to identify the consistent deviation
in XMV(11), which clearly explains their detection results for this fault. These results demonstrate
again that the r-PCA and r-DPCA models can exhibit much lower detection and identification
sensitivity than the BRNN method. The results of the f-PCA and f-DPCA models in Figures 14bd
clearly identify the deviations in several variables. However,the f-PCA and f-DPCA are oversensitive
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Figure 15: BRNN model outputs for TEP Fault 1.
and identify variables in an unspecific manner, which prevents those statistics from being used, at
least directly, by operators for diagnosing the root cause of the fault.
For the back-to-control fault, BRNN FDI had high accuracy and robustness. Moreover, this
method yielded more specific information for evaluating the state of the system. By inspecting the
identification plot, operators have a clear view about which variables are affected by the disturbance
and are able to assess the type of the fault occurring and the current stage of the system.
4.1.5. Uncontrollable fault: Fault 1
An uncontrollable fault is now considered. Fault 1 involves a step change in the A/C feed ratio in
Stream 4, which results in an increase in the C feed and a decrease in the A feed. This subsequently
leads to a decrease in feed A in the recycle Stream 5 and the controller reacts by increasing the A
feed flow in Stream 1. These two effects conflict with each other, thereby shifting the system to an
uncontrollable operating situation.
The BRNN model output results are shown in Figure 15. After the fault is introduced to
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Figure 16: Fault identification plot by BRNN-Dl for Fault 1. The root cause for this uncontrollable fault can be
assessed by looking at the variables that are persistently off the NOC region.
the system, more than half of the variables are observed to deviate significantly from the BRNN
predictive NOC region. All of the (D)PCA methods are also capable of detecting this fault.
The corresponding BRNN fault identification statistics are shown in Figure 16. Since the system
is seriously affected by the disturbance and several variables associated with material balances (e.g.,
composition, pressure) change significantly, this fault is easily detected. The long-term and uncon-
trollable nature of the fault on these measurements and manipulated variables can also be observed
in the identification plot, making the fault easy to diagnose based on those variables.
As before, the contribution plots by (D)PCA methods are shown in Figure 17. The r-PCA and
r-DPCA models, in Figure 17ac, both give somewhat results similar to those of the BRNN model in
Figure 16. However, both of them fail to identify the continued deviation in XMV(4) (shown between
XMV(3) and XMV(5) in Figure 17) for instance, which is the manipulated variable for total feed
flow in Stream 4 and clearly plays a central role in the fault. In contrast, it is clearly identifiable
from the BRNN results in Figure 16 that XMV(4) has negatively deviated from the NOC region.
The contribution plots of f-PCA and f-PCA in Figure 17bd show the identification of the involved
variables, but again highlight several other variables that are unrelated to the fault and operating
within their normal pattern (such as XMV(11)). As previously observed, this again shows that the
f-PCA and f-DPCA models are overly sensitive and their identification results require substantial
additional processing such that operators cannot directly use them to diagnose the fault.
In summary, the BRNN model is able to accurately and robustly detect and identify uncon-
trollable faults. Perhaps most crucially, BRNN identification plots provide clear information that
is directly useful for root cause analysis. While several (D)PCA models are also able to detect
uncontrollable faults, their identification results are less accurate and precise than for the BRNN
model.
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Figure 17: Contribution plots for Fault 1 from (a) r-PCA, (b) f-PCA, (c) r-DPCA, and (d) f-DPCA.
4.1.6. Fault propagation path analysis: Fault 6
This section shows how the accuracy and specificity of the BRNN identification statistics can be
used for fault propagation path analysis. The key observation is that the chronological sequence of
events of when each variable deviates significantly from its NOC is useful information to understand
the start and evolution of the disturbance through the process (Chiang and Braatz, 2003). The
BRNN method can extract this information with a high degree of temporal precision. This infor-
mation can then be combined with expert knowledge of the process to examine the propagation of
the fault through the system.
This approach is exemplified here using Fault 6, which is an uncontrollable fault induced by a
loss of feed A in Stream 1. The loss of component A thus causes the control system to increase the
manipulated variable XMV(3) in order to increase A in the system and attempt to compensate for
the disturbance. However, since there is no component A in Stream 1, the control system fails to
take the system back to NOC. Due to the severity of this fault, a large portion of system variables
is affected.
The temporal sequence of the fault through the process is achieved by sorting the identification
plot according to the time when each variable significantly deviates from the NOC. For this approach,
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Figure 18: Sorted fault identification plot according to the detected deviation occurrence time of BRNN-Dl for Fault
6.
one needs to estimate the threshold used to determine when the deviation is significant. In our case,
this is estimated using the NOC validation set and determined to be Dlth = 4.8. Then, once a fault
is detected, the process variables are sorted according to the time index at which its Dl statistic
first exceeds the threshold, yielding the sorted identification plot shown in Figure 18. The y-axis
numbers 1–52 correspond to [XMEAS(1), . . . ,XMEAS(41),XMV(1), . . . ,XMV(11)].
A diagram of the fault propagation path is then obtained by combining the timing results of
the sorted BRNN identification plot with the knowledge of the process, as demonstrated in Figure
19 for Fault 6. When the fault is introduced in the system, XMEAS(1) and XMV(3) are affected
and deviates from the NOC first. Then, after a few minutes, the reactor pressure measurement
XMEAS(7) is affected. Then the reactor cooling water system is also affected due to the change
in the mass inside the reactor and both XMEAS(21) and XMV(10) deviate from the NOC. The
diagram in Figure 19 highlights that, after 1 hour, the fault has already propagated to the final
product and the concentration of A and C have been affected, thus clearly showing the impact of
the fault in the system at that point in time.
The approach outlined here shows how the properties of the BRNN method can be used to easily
determine and visualize the fault propagation path. This information is crucial to operators to
accurately diagnose the fault and determine which parts of the process have been affected.
4.2. Real Industrial Dataset
The next case study further demonstrates the efficiency of the proposed BRNN method on a
real dataset from a chemical manufacturing process. The use of this method for real-time FDI is
a promising application for the next generation of process monitoring systems in chemical plants.
The complex nature of real chemical manufacturing processes and their intricate control system
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Figure 19: Fault 6 propagation path at the 180th data point (1 hour after the fault occurs). Colored nodes indicate
that the corresponding variable has been detected as deviating significantly from the NOC.
dynamics, make BRNN the best-suited tool to extract and recognize these patterns from data in
comparison to traditional methods.
The dataset pertains to the operation of an amine tower. The column experienced foaming
issues resulting in faults that decrease the efficiency of the process. There are a total of 20 sensor
measurements with a sampling time of t = 1 min. A total of two months of data are available. Two
events has been recorded by operators as a result of the foaming issue in the tower. However, it is
also possible that additional disturbances are encountered during the two-month operating window
that have been previously missed.
The final BRNN model uses standard RNN cells with the sigmoid activation function. There
is one hidden recurrent layer with 40 units (i.e., ‘state variables’). The dropout probability is set
to pd = 0.1 and the regularization parameter to λ = 10
−5. The BRNN model using LSTM or
GRU cells yield similar performance in spite of the higher complexity and thus those results are
omitted. Similar to the TEP data, the results are similar for a number of configurations of the
hyperparameters within a reasonable tuning range.
For comparison, the PCA and DPCA models, with the number of PCs determined by parallel
analysis and full models without dimension reduction, are also applied. The number of PCs from
parallel analysis is determined to be a = 6 for r-PCA and a = 9 for r-DPCA.
Due to the sensitivity of the data, the actual measurement values and the BRNN model pre-
dictions are omitted and only the detection and identification results are shown. The posterior
predictive distribution is observed to be multi-modal and thus the LDR statistics are used for FDI.
The number of kNN is set to the range of 10 to 20. The dataset is divided into a 35-day training
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Figure 20: FDI by the BRNN model on the Fault 1 testing data. The red box indicates the period with the foaming
event recorded by the operator.
dataset, a 17-day validation dataset, and two testing datasets. The first testing dataset spanned 7
days containing Fault 1, and the second testing dataset spanned 14 days containing Fault 2.
4.2.1. Fault 1 results
The BRNN FDI results for Fault 1 are shown in Figure 20. The BRNN model successfully detects
the documented event, marked by the red box in the figure. The model also accurately pinpoints
the variables that are most affected by the foaming issue, X1.PV and X6.PV. Moreover, it also
highlights several points after the 8000th time point that may have been originally missed. During
these later periods, the X1.MV sensor measurement is identified by the BRNN method. This is
subsequently verified to have been the result of large unexplained fluctuations in that variable and
that the BRNN has performed as expected.
For comparison, the corresponding FDI results by (D)PCA methods are shown in Figure 21. The
r-PCA and r-DPCA models simply fail to detect the fault. In the contribution plots, the r-PCA and
r-DPCA models also fail to identify any variable that is noticeably affected by the foaming event.
While (D)PCA models with reduced dimensionality determined by parallel analysis have been widely
applied (Chiang et al., 2000a; Yin et al., 2014; De Ketelaere et al., 2015; Valle et al., 1999), they
are incapable of accurately detecting the main fault in this case. For f-PCA and f-DPCA models,
the T 2 statistic is able to detect the documented fault. The contribution plots also identify X1.PV
and X6.PV as being associated with the fault. However, X1.MV and X6.MV are also identified
as abnormal and as more significantly than X1.PV and X6.PV. While those variables are likely
affected by the fault, they are operating normally with respect to the control system dynamics and
thus should not have been identified. Furthermore, some of these variables continue to be highlighted
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Figure 21: FDI by (D)PCA methods for Fault 1: (a) r-PCA, (b) f-PCA, (c) r-DPCA, and (d) f-DPCA. The red box
indicates the period with the foaming event recorded by the operator.
well after the issue is resolved. The (D)PCA models also only scantly detect the deviations in the
later time that are correctly highlighted by the BRNN.
4.2.2. Fault 2 results
The BRNN FDI results for Fault 2 are shown in Figure 22. The proposed method successfully
detects the documented fault and identifying the related variables, as marked by time interval with
the red box. For the earlier period around the 6000th time point, the BRNN model detects a
disturbance and identifies the deviation in X14.PV, X15.PV, and X9.PV. The relative magnitude
of the deviation during those periods is not as significant as that during the documented fault
period. This assessment was then verified to be fully warranted by inspection of the recorded sensor
measurements. Analysis of the period around the 15000th data point yield similar results.
As before, the (D)PCA FDI methods are also applied. Their results are shown in Figure 23.
As observed for Fault 1, the r-PCA and r-DPCA models are not as sensitive to the fault and only
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Figure 22: FDI by BRNN for Fault 2. The red box indicates the period with the foaming issue as recorded by the
operator.
Figure 23: FDI by (D)PCA methods for Fault 2: (a) r-PCA, (b) f-PCA, (c) r-DPCA, and (d) f-DPCA. The red box
indicates the period with the foaming issue as recorded by the operator.
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partially detect the documented fault period, and they did not detect the earlier event highlighted
by the BRNN method. The identification plots by the r-PCA and r-DPCA models in Figures 23ac
also only identify a limited number of faulty variables. The f-PCA and f-DPCA models are again
overly sensitive for both FDI, flagging much of the data period. After the foaming issue occurred
and the operator intervention, the control system is able to compensate for the disturbance after
a while. However, f-PCA and f-DPCA models incorrectly continue to assess the system as in an
abnormal state even though the foaming issue has been fully resolved. This can also be observed
from the contribution plots in Figures 23bd, wherein variables X1.PV and X6.MV are identified as
problematic during and long after the resolution of the fault.
To summarize, this case study on real data from a chemical process demonstrates the higher ac-
curacy, specificity, and robustness in FDI of the BRNN-based method over (D)PCA-based methods.
The proposed method is also shown to provide precise and easily interpretable results for prompt
diagnosis and mitigation of fault events in real manufacturing processes.
5. Conclusion
This article proposes a novel BRNN-based FDI method for manufacturing processes. The pro-
posed method simultaneously tackles three key challenges in modeling real process data: (1) con-
current spatio-temporal correlations, (2) nonlinearity, and (3) incomplete characterization of the
uncertainty in process noise and dynamics. The BRNN model addresses these challenges because of
its probabilistic framework built on RNN models. And, for implementation efficiency, the inference
is made using variational dropout, which both regularizes the NN during training and efficiently
estimates the uncertainty as it evolves through time.
The uncertainty estimates of the BRNN model play a crucial role in FDI. By continuously
estimating the uncertainty, the BRNN model provides adaptive confidence intervals that fully char-
acterize the system dynamics based on the current and past information. As demonstrated here,
the BRNN framework therefore enables:
(1) fault detection in processes with nonlinear dynamics, and
(2) direct fault identification with easily interpreted identification plots and fault propagation path
analysis.
The effectiveness of the proposed BRNN method is demonstrated in two case studies: (1) the
benchmark TEP dataset and (2) a real chemical manufacturing dataset. The proposed method is
compared to the widely applied PCA and DPCA methods, using either full and reduced dimension
models. The comparisons show that the BRNN model provides results that are accurate and more
specific and directly relevant for fault identification. Furthermore, based on its results, one can
distinguish the nature of the faults, between controllable, back to control, or uncontrollable faults.
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More broadly, the application of Bayesian methods to fault detection is not a widely explored
field. To that end, this paper demonstrates a novel framework involving the systematic application
of spatio-temporal models with Bayesian estimation such that the posterior inference results are
directly relevant for detection and identification. In this case, a BRNN is used, but the strategy
could be adapted for other spatio-temporal models such as dynamic process models.
The proposed BRNN-based FDI framework can be directly applied to any manufacturing process
with historical NOC measurements without significant modifications. Moreover, the easy implemen-
tation of variational dropout to any model architecture and concurrent online calculating capability
make BRNN feasible for large-scale industrial applications.
Some considerations for future work might include:
(1) The online adaptation of the BRNN model for changing NOC. In real chemical processes, the
process conditions evolve and it is unlikely that the training data can cover all of the NOC
modes. Thus, online adaptation is crucial for reducing false alarms and maintenance costs.
(2) While proposed here for FDI, the BRNN model framework also has broad potential applications
in industrial manufacturing processes related to time series analysis. The variational dropout
can be applied to any deep learning model without modification of the model architecture, which
makes it a preferable probabilistic model as compared to other recent advanced techniques.
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